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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration

by Mary F. Radford*
This Article describes selected cases and significant legislation from
the period of June 1, 2014 through May 31, 2015 pertaining to Georgia
fiduciary law and estate planning.'
I.

A.

GEORGIA CASES

Children as Heirs of a Decedent

In two cases during the survey period, Georgia appellate courts
discussed who constitutes a "child" and thus an heir of a decedent who
dies without a valid will (intestate). Both of these cases involved
unusual fact situations.
In the first of these cases, In re Estate of Hawkins,2 the Georgia Court
of Appeals examined the interaction between a relatively new set of
Georgia statutes relating to the "voluntary legitimation" of a child born
out of wedlock,3 and section 53-2-3 of the Official Code of Georgia
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1. For an analysis of Georgia fiduciary law and estate planning during the prior survey
period, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,
Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 66 MERCER L. REV. 231 (2014).
2. 328 Ga. App. 436, 762 S.E.2d 149 (2014), cert. denied, 2014 Ga. LEXIS 870 (2014).
3. See O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-21.1, -22(g), -46.1 (2015).
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(O.C.G.A.), which is the Georgia Probate Code statute4 that describes
when a child who is born out of wedlock may inherit from his biological
father.' When the decedent in this case, James Hawkins, died without
a will, his girlfriend petitioned to have her son declared as his sole
heir.' Both Hawkins and his girlfriend knew that Hawkins was not the
biological father of the child. However, the day after the child was born,
Hawkins accompanied his girlfriend to the State Vital Records Office
and completed a form that stated Hawkins was the child's father and
requested that Hawkins be listed as the father on the child's birth
certificate. A worker at the records office signed the paternity acknowledgement form as a witness. The same worker's name also appeared on
the child's birth certificate, which named Hawkins and his girlfriend as
the parents. Hawkins held out the child as his own and named the child
as a dependent for his Social Security and Veterans Administration
benefits. Hawkins never adopted the child and died five years after the
child was born.
The girlfriend claimed the child's status as Hawkins' heir under
O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3(2)(A).8 O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(iii) allows a child born
out of wedlock to inherit from the father if "[t]he father has executed a
sworn statement signed by him attesting to the parent-child relationship."' O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(iv) allows a child to inherit from the
father if "[t]he father has signed the birth certificate of the child.""o
The probate court refused to recognize the child as Hawkins' heir and
the court of appeals affirmed." The court of appeals pointed out that
"there were no court proceedings begun before Hawkins' death either to
legitimate [the child] or otherwise to establish paternity;"" that
Hawkins did not sign the child's birth certificate prior to his death
(although the court acknowledged that Georgia birth certificates
generally are not signed); and that the records office worker who

4. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3 (2011).
5. In re Estate of Hawkins, 328 Ga. App. at 439, 762 S.E.2d at 152. For an in-depth
discussion of the inheritance rights of children born out of wedlock, see MARY F. RADFORD,
REDFEARN: WILLS & ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA § 9:5 (7th ed. 2008).
6. The decedent was not married when he died. Under O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(c)(3), if a
decedent who dies intestate is not survived by a spouse, the decedent's children and other
descendants are the decedent's heirs. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1(c)(3) (2011).
7. In re Estate of Hawkins, 328 Ga. App. at 436-38, 762 S.E.2d at 150-51.
8. Id. at 436, 762 S.E.2d at 150.
9. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(iii).
10. Id. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(iv).
11. In re Estate of Hawkins, 328 Ga. App. at 436, 762 S.E.2d at 150.
12. Id. at 439, 762 S.E.2d at 152. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-2-3(2)(A)(i) and (ii) allow a child born
out of wedlock to inherit if a court has entered an order declaring the child to be legitimate
or otherwise entered an order establishing paternity. O.C.G.A. §§ 53-2-3(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
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witnessed the acknowledgment was not a notary public or other official
who had the authority to administer any oath to Hawkins that would
make the paternity acknowledgment a "sworn statement."s
Judge Michael Boggs filed a special concurrence in which he discussed
at length the voluntary legitimation process that O.C.G.A. §§ 19-7-21.1,
22(g), and -46.1 authorizes. 4 Judge Boggs described the process as
"unquestionably inequitable and susceptible to fraud, in irreconcilable
conflict with the body of Georgia law on legitimation and adoption, and
potentially violative of the constitutional protections guaranteed to
biological fathers and their children."" Judge Boggs began by pointing
out that prior to the enactment of these statutes, a superior court alone
had the authority to grant a petition to legitimate a child and to deny
the legitimation if it was not in the child's best interest."6 Judge Boggs
lauded the "objective scrutiny" that this judicial process guaranteed."
Judge Boggs then described how the new laws established a non-judicial
method by which the mother of a child and an individual purporting to
be the child's father could make a voluntary acknowledgement of
paternity.' 8 This legislation prompted the promulgation of the form
Hawkins and his girlfriend signed." Judge Boggs explained that this
voluntary acknowledgement, without any judicial oversight, could result
in significant harm to both the true biological father and the child."0

13. In re Estate of Hawkins, 328 Ga. App. at 439-40, 762 S.E.2d at 152-53.
14. Id. at 442-43, 762 S.E.2d at 151-52 (Boggs, J., concurring fully and specially).
15. Id. at 441, 762 S.E.2d at 154. In writing this opinion, Judge Boggs utilized the
research of Atlanta adoption attorney James Outman. See id. at 443 n.8, 762 S.E.2d at 154
n.8.
16. Id. at 441-42, 762 S.E.2d at 154.
17. Id. at 442, 762 S.E.2d at 154.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 443, 762 S.E.2d at 155.
20. Id. at 444, 762 S.E.2d at 156. Judge Boggs explained this harm as follows:
Opportunities for fraud and collusion abound in this flawed scheme. Not only to
establish a false paternity to obtain dependent benefits, as was alleged in this
case, but for revenge following a failed relationship, or for monetary gain through
obtaining control over a minor child's assets or claim for personal injury.
Moreover, a man who signs the form believing himself to be the father, but later
determines that he is not, may be bound to pay child support and to reimburse the
State for public assistance paid to the mother, while the actual, biological father
may be excused from his obligations. In all such cases, the opportunity to
establish the true state of affairs and the best interest of the child, as well as due
process of law for the child and the biological father, are frustrated by these
statutes.
Id. at 445, 762 S.E.2d at 156.
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The second of these cases discussed the equitable doctrine of "virtual
adoption."2 ' Virtual adoption is a declaration the court issues after a
decedent has died that allows a child whom the decedent agreed to adopt
to be treated, for inheritance purposes, as if the child had been legally
adopted.2 2
In Sanders v. Riley,23 the Georgia Supreme Court determined the
inheritance rights of a woman who was raised believing that her
mother's husband was her biological father, only to find out at age
fourteen that her true biological father was a man with whom her
mother had been having an affair during her marriage. 24 The evidence
showed that the mother, her husband, and the true biological father
agreed that the husband would treat the child as his own child, even
though he knew she was not his biological daughter. The mother and
her husband were estranged but the husband helped support the child,
the child used his surname, and the husband held the child out as his
own, including on her wedding invitations.25
The Georgia Supreme Court examined Georgia's long history of
recognizing virtual adoptions and concluded that the probate court erred
when it granted summary judgment against the daughter.26 The
supreme court found that there was some evidence to show the required
contract to adopt and that the husband had partially performed that
contract.27 In addition, the supreme court addressed the fact that the
child did have some contact with her biological father after she learned
about his existence even though this contact did not, according to the
child, amount to a father-child relationship.2 8 The supreme court found
"no authority for the proposition that once the child's status has changed
in the course of a virtual adoption-where a contract to adopt has been
partially performed-the child can then become 'unadopted' simply by
developing a relationship later in life with a natural parent." 2 9 The
supreme court concluded, "Just as children, once legally adopted, do not
become unadopted by forming a relationship later in life with their
biological parents-something that is occurring with increasing

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See Sanders v. Riley, 296 Ga. 693, 693-94, 770 S.E.2d 570, 571 (2016).
For an in-depth discussion of virtual adoption, see RADFORD, supranote 5, at § 9:4.
296 Ga. 693, 770 S.E.2d 570 (2015).
Id. at 693-94, 965, 770 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id. at 695-96, 770 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id. at 703, 770 S.E.2d at 577.
Id. at 701, 770 S.E.2d at 576.

28.

Id.

29. Id. at 703, 770 S.E.2d at 577.
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frequency-children, once virtually adopted, do not become unadopted
by developing a relationship later on with their biological parents."30
B.

Standing to Offer a Will for Probate

In Ray v. Stevens," the Georgia Supreme Court explored the question
of who has standing to offer a will for probate.3 2 Under O.C.G.A. § 535-2," the right to offer a will for probate belongs to the executor.
However, if the executor fails to do so, "any interested person may offer
In this case, the executor chose not to offer the
the will for probate."
will for probate. Shane Stevens, the decedent's brother, then attempted
to do so. He claimed to be an "interested person" because he was a
creditor of the decedent.3 ' The supreme court held, however, that the
brother failed to prove that he was an interested person.3 ' The court
looked to past cases in which heirs of the decedent as well as beneficiaries under the will or a former will, purchasers from or judgment
creditors of an heir, and administrators appointed before the will was
discovered were deemed interested persons for the purpose of probating
or caveating (challenging) a will.38

The court pointed out that the

brother did not fall into any of these categories. 39 The court also noted
that, as a creditor of the estate, it was immaterial to the brother
whether the will was probated because a creditor can receive payment
from an administrator (who is appointed if there is not a will) as well as
from an executor.4 0
Unwittingly, perhaps, this holding of the supreme court may divest
general creditors of an opportunity to force an estate to be opened in
order to address claims when a named executor refuses to offer the will
for probate. The court seemed to indicate that a creditor would be able
to collect the debt even if an administrator, rather than an executor, was

30. Id.
31. 295 Ga. 895, 764 S.E.2d 809 (2014).
32. Id. at 895, 764 S.E.2d at 810. The purpose of the probate process is to establish the
will as the true will of the testator, and the law does not recognize a will or the
appointment of the executor until the will has been proved before the probate court. See
Brown v. Newkirk, 239 Ga. 579, 581, 238 S.E.2d 352, 354 (1977). For an in-depth
discussion of the probate process, see RADFORD, supra note 5, at ch. 6.
33. O.C.G.A. § 53-5-2 (2011).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Ray, 295 Ga. at 896, 764 S.E.2d at 810.
37. Id. at 898, 764 S.E.2d at 811.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 897-98, 764 S.E.2d at 811.
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appointed. But, at least in cases in which the general creditor knows of
the existence of a will, the creditor cannot file a petition for the
appointment of an administrator because an administrator can only be
appointed if there is no valid will.4 1
C.

Construction of the Terms of a Will

Courts are sometimes called upon to discern a testator's intent when
the words of the will are ambiguous. In Thompson v. Blackwell,4 2 the
question that arose was whether the testator intended to convey a fee
simple interest or only a life estate in the property that he devised to his
wife.4 3 One item in the testator's will stated, "I give, devise and
bequeath to my wife, Hattie F. King, all my property, both real and
personal, wherever located and whenever acquired, either before or after
the making of this my Will, hers in Fee Simple."4 4 The next item
stated that "[ulpon the death of my said wife," all of his interest in the
property would be devised to his son and his son's children.45
After looking at the language of the will and examining prior case law,
the Georgia Supreme Court held it was the testator's clear intention to
convey only a life estate in the property to his wife, with the remainder
to be given to his son and grandchildren. 46 The court's reasoning was
that all items in the will must be read together and their meaning based
on the entire document, not individual items.4 7 The court also cited the
rule of construction that states that "where property is devised in
language sufficient to pass a fee-simple estate, the devise should not be
held to convey a lesser estate unless it is clear from a subsequent
4
provision of the will that such was the intention of the testator." 8
The supreme court distinguished the wording of the testator's will
from that in other wills that used phrases such as "in the event [that my
wife should die]" or "should [my wife die]."4 In those cases, the court
held the language was found to convey a fee simple because the
language referred to the death of the first taker as a contingent event.50

41.
as the
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
629, 1
49.
50.

See id. at 898, 764 S.E.2d at 811. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-2(1) defines an "administrator"
person who administers an intestate estate. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-2(1) (2011).
296 Ga. 443, 769 S.E.2d 46 (2015).
Id. at 443, 769 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 443-44, 769 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 444, 769 S.E.2d at 47.
Id. at 447, 769 S.E.2d at 49.
Id. at 445-46, 769 S.E.2d at 48-49.
Id. at 445, 769 S.E.2d at 48 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Watts v. Finley, 187 Ga.
S.E.2d 723 (1939)).
Id. at 446-47, 769 S.E.2d at 49.
Id. at 447, 769 S.E.2d at 49.
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The court construed the language to mean that the subsequent grant
would take place only if the first grantee actually died before the
testator died." The court focused on the Thompson testator's phrase
"upon the death of my said wife" and stated that the word "upon" is "an
adverb of time, and not of contingency."5 2 Thus, the testator clearly
was not referring to the possible death of his wife before himself, but
rather he intended to give his wife a life estate followed by a remainder
to his son and grandchildren."
D.

Modification of '-usts

In Strange v. Towns, the Georgia Court of Appeals examined
whether a settlor's actions resulted in a modification of her revocable
inter vivos trust.55 The settlor's trust named herself as trustee. Ten
years after setting up the trust, she amended the trust naming three
individuals including her son, Tony, as successor co-trustees. 6 The
year after amending her trust, the settlor executed a durable financial
power of attorney (POA) in which she stated that she wished Tony to be
"the executor of her estate and the Trust."5 Both she and Tony signed
the POA and it was notarized. The next year the settlor wrote a letter
to a lawyer at the law firm who had revised the trust, stating that the
firm had misunderstood her wishes. She stated in the letter that the
trust needed to be revised again to show that Tony would be the trustee
and executor and the other two named individuals would only be
alternates. She also added that she had executed a document to reflect
the revisions to the trust should the law firm fail to make the changes
prior to her death. The changes were not made and, when she died, the
question arose as to who should serve as trustee, or co-trustees, of the
trust.58

The court of appeals concluded that the settlor's actions clearly showed
her intent to amend the trust and resulted in a modification of the trust
such that Tony would serve as the sole trustee." The court looked first
to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-40(c)," which requires a trust modification or

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 446, 447, 769 S.E.2d at 49 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 447, 769 S.E.2d at 49.
330 Ga. App. 876, 769 S.E.2d 604 (2015).
Id. at 876, 769 S.E.2d at 605.
Id.
Id. at 876-77, 769 S.E.2d at 605.
Id. at 877, 769 S.E.2d at 606.
Id. at 879, 769 S.E.2d at 607.
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-40(c) (2011).
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revocation to be in writing and signed by the settlor.6 ' The court then
looked to the terms of the trust itself, which provided that "[tihe Settlor
may at any time by duly executed written instrument alter or amend
this Trust in any manner."62 Apparently, the other individuals named
as co-trustees had argued that the POA was not "duly executed" by a
notary." The court of appeals pointed out that O.C.G.A. § 53-12-40(c)
does not require a notarized writing.64 However, even if the words of
the trust arguably required an authenticated document, the court noted
that the notary public had signed the document, stamped it with a
stamp that said "Notary Public," and included the notary's name and the
state and county of her appointment.6
The court said that this
satisfied the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 45-17-6(a), which allows the
use of a stamp for importing the notary's "seal."6
In addition, the
court of appeals was not bothered by the settlor's use of the word
"executor" instead of "trustee" in the POA as the other words of the POA
showed that she clearly intended for Tony to have "full ownership" of the
trust. 6 Finally, the court of appeals rejected the named co-trustees'
argument that the settlor's letter to the lawyer indicated that she did
not mean for the POA itself to revise the trust.69 The court of appeals
pointed out that the settlor "confirmed" in the letter that she had
already made the revision in writing and that she, as settlor, was the
only person who had the power to revise the trust. 70 The court of
appeals concluded that "[t]he fact that the law firm did not update the
Trust to incorporate Pauline's intent did not render the July 9 power of
attorney invalid ....
E.

Non-probate Property:Multiple Party Accounts

The Georgia statutes relating to multiple party bank accounts 72
govern the ownership of the property in those accounts during the

61. Strange, 330 Ga. App. at 877, 769 S.E.2d at 606; see also O.C.G.A. § 53-12-40(c).
62. Strange, 330 Ga. App. at 877, 769 S.E.2d at 606 (alteration in original).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. O.C.G.A. § 45-17-6(a) (2002).
67. Strange, 330 Ga. App. at 877-78, 769 S.E.2d at 606; see also O.C.G.A. § 45-17-6(a).
68. Strange, 330 Ga. App. at 878, 769 S.E.2d at 607.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-810 to -821 (2015). For an in-depth discussion of these statutes,
see RADFORD, supra note 5, at § 2:5.

20151

WILLS & TRUSTS

281

depositor's life and at death.7 ' These statutes are confusing to some
because the ownership rights created by these statutes cannot be
changed by a decedent's will and apply even if the will gives "all" of the
decedent's property to someone else. Even more confusing is that
different rules apply depending upon whether the depositor of the funds
in the multiple party account is alive or is deceased. In Howard v.
Leonard,4 the Georgia Court of Appeals emphasized the difference
between these rules." If the account is a "joint account"76 then while
the parties to the account are alive the amounts in the account belong
to each party in proportion to his or her contributions unless there is
When a party
clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent.7
dies, the presumption is that the sums then belong to the surviving
parties, unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent
at the time the account was created."
F

Adult Guardianship:Visitation Rights

In In re Estate of Wertzer," the Georgia Court of Appeals discussed
the interplay between a guardian's authority to make decisions about the
ward's welfare and the probate court's authority to guard the ward's
retained rights.8 o Grace Wertzer (mother) and Saul Wertzer (father)
were divorced in 2004. The mother was granted sole legal and physical
custody of their child, Sierra Leigh Wertzer (then a minor), who was
incapacitated due to her autism, hearing loss, non-verbal/apraxia, visual
impairment, and mental retardation diagnoses. The father was granted
limited visitation at the time of the divorce.
In April 2013, the father filed a petition to modify visitation. In
response, the mother moved to suspend the father's visitation. In May
2013, the mother filed a Petition for Appointment of a Guardian or
Conservator in anticipation of the child turning age eighteen. In
response, the father moved to intervene and asked for his visitation

73. See O.C.G.A. §§ 7-1-810 to -821.
74. 330 Ga. App. 331, 765 S.E.2d 466 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (2014), cert. denied
(2015).
75. Id. at 335, 765 S.E.2d at 469.
76. A "joint account" is "an account payable on request to one or more of two or more
parties, whether or not mention is made of any right of survivorship." O.C.G.A. § 7-1810(4) (2015).
77. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-812(a) (2015).
78. O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(a) (2015).
79. 330 Ga. App. 294, 765 S.E.2d 425 (2014), reconsiderationdenied (2014), cert. denied
(2015).
80. Id. at 294, 765 S.E.2d at 426.
81. Id. at 294-95, 294 n.1, 765 S.E.2d at 426-27, 426 n.1.
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rights to be extended to include overnight visits and a week-long
visitation in the summer. Additionally, the father requested to be
notified of any changes in his child's medical conditions, maintenance
medications, physicians, and residential status. The probate court
granted the mother's petition for guardianship. The mother then moved
to dismiss the father's request for increased visitation, saying the
probate court lacked authority to "force" Sierra to visit with her father.
The probate court denied this motion and granted the father supervised
visitation for a few extra hours but denied the request for overnight
visitation and the extended summer visitation. The medical notification
request was ordered by the probate court, as it was consistent with the
divorce settlement, and the probate court added that the mother was
required to allow the father access to all of Sierra's medical and
educational information.82 The mother appealed arguing that imposing
visitation on an adult ward was outside of the authority of the probate
court."
The court of appeals affirmed the visitation ruling of the probate
court." The court of appeals pointed out that O.C.G.A. § 29-4-2085
grants certain rights to all wards, such as the right to a guardian who
acts in the best interest of the ward and the right to "[c]ommunicate
freely and privately with persons other than the guardian ....
This
latter right included Sierra's right to visit with her father." The
mother also contended that the court erred because the order impeded
her duties as a guardian, the required visitation was not in Sierra's best
interest, and she (the mother) should not be required to communicate on
a regular basis with the father and to confer with him on all important
issues regarding Sierra.8 8 Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30(a),89 the
probate court has authority to exercise jurisdiction over "[a]ll controversies as to the right of guardianship. .. ."9 Further, O.C.G.A. § 29-413(a)91 provides that the order granting or denying the guardianship
"shall specify" any "limitations on the guardianship."9 2 O.C.G.A. § 29-

82. Id. at 294, 295, 296, 765 S.E.2d at 427.
83. Id. at 296, 765 S.E.2d at 427.
84. Id. at 301, 765 S.E.2d at 431.
85. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-20 (2007).
86. In re Estate of Wertzer, 330 Ga. App. at 297, 765 S.E.2d at 428 (brackets in original)
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 29-4-20(9)(4)).
87. See id. at 297, 765 S.E.2d at 429.
88. Id. at 296, 765 S.E.2d at 427-28.
89. O.C.G.A. § 15-9-30(a) (2015).
90. Id. § 15-9-30(a)(6).
91. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-13(a) (2007).
92. Id. § 29-4-13(a)(3).
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4-22" says that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law or by the court,
a guardian shall make decisions regarding the ward's support, care,
education, health, and welfare."" The court of appeals agreed with the
probate court that while the guardian has the broad authority to make
decisions for the ward, he or she is limited by orders of the court
pursuant to these statutes.s One of those limitations is the visitation
to the father.9 6 The court of appeals noted that it previously held that
the court could order visitation over the objection of a guardian." The
court of appeals gave no credit to the mother's argument that the
probate court's order impeded her ability to perform her statutory duty
under O.C.G.A. § 29-4-22(b)(2) to "remain personally acquainted with the
ward and maintain sufficient contact with the ward to know of the
ward's capacities, limitations, needs, opportunities, and physical and
mental health."" The court of appeals affirmed the probate court's
finding that visits with her father were in Sierra's best interest." The
court of appeals noted that both Sierra's attorney and the guardian ad
litem had suggested that the visitation schedule remain in effect.oo
On one final point, the court of appeals agreed with the mother that the
probate court only had the power to require the mother to "inform" the
father of certain changes in Sierra's condition but did not have the power
to require her to "consult" with the father because doing so would
essentially elevate him to the status of co-guardian.o'
II.

GEORGIA LEGISLATION: NEW POLST STATUTE O.C.G.A.

§ 31-1-14

A Physician Order for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) is a medical
order concerning the patient's end of life care that is based on an
agreement between a patient who has a serious illness or frailty and the
patient's physician.1 02 In 2010 Georgia joined a number of other states
that have enacted POLST statutes, but with fairly minimalist legisla-

93. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-22 (2007).
94. Id. § 29-4-22(a).
95. In re Estate of Wertzer, 330 Ga. App. at 298, 765 S.E.2d at 428.
96. Id. at 298, 765 S.E.2d at 428-29.
97. Id. at 299, 765 S.E.2d at 429; see also Mitchum v. Manning, 304 Ga. App. 842, 843,
698 S.E.2d 360, 361 (2010).
98. In re Estate of Wertzer, 330 Ga. App. at 299-300, 765 S.E.2d at 430 (quoting
O.C.G.A. § 29-4-22(b)(2)).
99. Id. at 301, 765 S.E.2d at 431.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 301-02, 765 S.E.2d at 431.
102. For an in-depth discussion of POLSTs, see MARY F. RADFORD, GUARDIANSHIP AND
CONSERVATORSHIP IN GEORGIA

§ 1:17

(2015-16 ed.).
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tion."' When O.C.G.A. § 29-4-18104 was enacted, the statute included a direction to the Georgia Department of Community Health to
develop and make available a POLST form.' In 2012 this statute
was amended to provide immunity for any person acting in good faith in
accordance with a POLST. 0 6 In 2015 the Georgia General Assembly
enacted O.C.G.A. § 31-1-14,10' a full-blown POLST statute. 0 8 This
statute describes the effect and implementation of a POLST and sets out
liability and immunity provisions for physicians and other health care
providers who act in accordance with the directions in a POLST.' 0
POLSTs begin with a conversation or series of conversations between
an attending physician and a patient who has "decision making
capacity." 1 o The POLST form is typically executed when the patient
"has a serious illness or condition and the attending physician's reasoned
judgment is that the patient will die within the next 365 days."
However, if the patient has been diagnosed with "dementia or another
progressive, degenerative disease or condition that attacks the brain and
results in impaired memory, thinking, and behavior," the POLST may
be executed at any time.'12
If the patient lacks decision making capacity, the POLST may be
consented to and signed by an "authorized person."'
An authorized
person under the POLST statute is anyone who may consent to the
patient's medical treatment under O.C.G.A. § 31-39-2,114 which describes who may consent to a "do not resuscitate" order (DNR) on behalf
of a patient."' Authorized persons, in order of preference, are as

103. See O.C.G.A. § 29-4-14 (Supp. 2015).
104. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-18 (Supp. 2014).
105. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-18(1) (repealed and replaced by Ga. S. Bill 109, Reg. Sess. (2015),
which further enacted O.C.G.A. § 31-1-14 (Supp. 2015)).
106. O.C.G.A. § 29-4-18(k)(1)(3) (repealed and replaced by Ga. S. Bill 109, Reg. Sess.
(2015), which further enacted O.C.G.A. § 31-1-14).
107. O.C.G.A. § 31-1-14 (Supp. 2015).
108. Ga. S. Bill 109 § 1, Reg. Sess. (2015) (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 31-1-14
(Supp. 2015)).
109. See O.C.G.A. § 31-1-14.
110. See id. § 31-1-14(a)(3). Section 31-1-14(a)(8) defines "decision making dapacity" as
"the ability to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of an order
regarding end of life care decisions, including the benefits and disadvantages of such an
order, and to reach an informed decision regarding the order." Id.
111. Id. § 31-1-14(b).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. O.C.G.A. § 31-39-2 (2012).
115. Id. An "order not to resuscitate" is defined in O.C.G.A. § 31-39-2(9) as "an order
not to attempt cardiopulmonary resuscitation in the event a patient suffers cardiac or
respiratory arrest, or both." Id. § 31-39-2(9).
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follows: (1) the patient's agent under a health care advance directive or
durable health care power of attorney; (2) the patient's spouse; (3) the
patient's guardian; (4) an adult child of the patient; (5) a parent of the
patient; or (6) an adult sibling of the patient."' There are some
limitations on the effectiveness of a POLST when the authorized person
is someone other than the patient or the agent named in the patient's
advance directive for health care."'

116.
117.

Id. § 31-39-2(3).
See, e.g., O.C.G.A.

§§

31-39-4(b), 31-39-4(c) (2012 & Supp. 2015).
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